Japan\u27s Domestic Politics and China Policy: The Yasukuni Controversy (2006-07) by Cheung Mong
Japan’s Domestic Politics and China 
Policy: The Yasukuni Controversy 
(2006-07)
Mong Cheung*
Abstract
Japan’s China policy in the post-Cold War era has often been portrayed as a 
strategic response to the rise of China in East Asia. Existing literature on the sub-
ject most often assumes that Japan’s China policy has been guided by a unified, 
well-calculated foreign strategy vis-à-vis China’s growing national power since 
the late 1990s. In this article, the author challenges this assumption and argues that 
domestic politics within Japan oftentimes plays a decisive role in Japan’s foreign 
policy towards China. By examining Japan’s response toward Chinese pressure 
over the Yasukuni issue between 2006 and 2007, this article offers an alternative 
interpretation of Japan’s China policy by highlighting the domestic legitimacy 
of individual political leaders. The author further suggests that impacts of other 
aspects of Japanese domestic politics on its foreign policy toward China, such as 
regime transition/the frequent change of prime ministers and the rivalry between 
the ruling party and elite bureaucrats, should also be taken up for more thorough 
investigation.
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It is unnecessary to make a clear stance on the Yasukuni issue as it will be utilized 
by China, South Korea and politicians within Japan.   
Abe Shinzo1
Since the late 1990s, relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and 
Japan have been undergoing tremendous structural changes within East Asian 
international politics. Japan’s China policy since this period has in great part been 
viewed as a strategic response to the rise of China in East Asia. Many works in 
the existing literature, from the writings of scholars to journalists and diplomatic 
observers, assume that Japan is a unitary actor and that its China policy has been 
guided by a unified, well-calculated foreign strategy with a focus on China’s 
growing national power in the last two decades. 
This article challenges the assumption that Japan’s response toward China’s 
rise is guided by this aforementioned “unified, well-calculated foreign strategy”. 
Instead, it will be argued that domestic politics within Japan often play a decisive 
role in Japan’s foreign policy towards China. By examining Japan’s response 
toward Chinese pressure over the Yasukuni issue between 2006 and 2007, this 
article offers an alternative perspective to Japan’s China policy by focusing on the 
domestic legitimacy of individual political leaders in Japan’s China policymaking. 
The article further suggests that other aspects of Japanese domestic politics, such 
as regime transition, the frequent change of prime ministers and the coordination 
problem between the ruling party and elite bureaucrats, should also be studied in 
detail. 
1. Conventional Analysis of Japan’s China Policy
Since the 1990s, Japan’s China policy has often been viewed as a strategic 
response to the rise of China. The consequence of the rise of China to the 
international material structure has been viewed as a major motivation behind 
Japan’s shifting China policy.  Mike Mochizuki, for example, identified four 
strategic options that emerged in the domestic debate within Japan with regards 
to the rise of China: 1) cooperative engagement with a soft hedge, 2) competi-
tive engagement with a hard hedge, 3) balancing and containment, and 4) stra-
tegic accommodation.2 Mochizuki points out that recent evolution of Japan’s 
1 Abe’s public speech on June 11, 2006. See Shibata Gaku, “Sousaisen, saidai no ronten 
Yasukuni omegurujimintou no hyakkasoumei [The LDP Presidential Election: A Hot Debate 
within the LDP over the Yasukuni Issue],” Chuokoron (August 2006): 211. 
2 Mike M. Mochizuki, “Japan’s Shifting Strategy toward the Rise of China,” The Journal of 
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strategy towards China is compatible with different theoretical expectations such 
as offensive realism, defensive realism, and liberalism. He argues that Japan has 
shifted away from friendship diplomacy toward a mixed strategy that involves 
both cooperative engagement and realistic balancing to hedge against the potential 
threats that rising China may pose in the future.3
Scholars of Sino-Japanese relations and international relations studies also in-
terpreted Japan’s China policy through a foreign strategy perspective. Some schol-
ars argue that, precisely because of the collapse of “the 1955 system” and the de-
cline of progressive forces within Japan since the mid-1990s, the neo-conservative 
and nationalistic forces within Japan would be able to take an assertive stance, one 
that intends to lead Japan toward the path of the “normal country.” 4 The essence 
of the so-called “normal country,” according to Ryu, for example, mainly refers to 
the constitutional revision of Article Nine, the state’s right to mourn its war dead 
and to improve the low level of patriotism among the Japanese public.5 By follow-
ing this stream of analysis, Japan’s assertive policy toward China in certain areas 
(such as maritime disputes and the Yasukuni problem) has been seen as an effort 
to promote neo-conservatism, historical revisionism and defense policy reforms, 
aiming to transform Japan into a normal nation-state in the 21st century. Zhu ar-
gues, for example, that Japan’s assertive China policy visible in various policy ar-
eas in recent years has been determined by strategic choices prompted by the rise 
of China in East Asia.6  
It would be absurd, of course, to deny the impact of strategic calculation in the 
decision-making process of Japan’s China policy. But most often, from a micro-
analytical perspective, domestic politics act in a much more complex way within 
Japan that is less related to foreign strategy calculation. Conventional arguments 
often take for granted that Japan’s foreign policy in most issue areas related to 
Strategic Studies 30, no. 4-5: 739-76.
3 Ibid, 767-73.
4 Many scholars interpret the issue from the normal country perspective. For example, 
Lam Peng Er, “Japan’s Deteriorating Ties with China: The Koizumi Factor,” China: An 
International Journal 3, no. 2 (September 2005): 275-91; Li Jianmin, Lengzhanhou riben de 
putongguojiahua yu zhongrgguanxi de fazhan [The Normalization of Post-Cold War Japan and 
the Development of Sino-Japanese Relations] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe), 
308; Zhou Yongshen, “Xiaoquan neige de waijiao zhence qianqi” [An Analysis of the Foreign 
Policy of the Koizumi Administration], Riben Xuankan [Japanese Study] 5 (2006): 30-31; Li 
Jianmin, Lengzhanhou de zhongriguanxishi [The History of Sino-Japanese Relations in the 
Post-Cold War Era] (Beijing: Zhongguo jingji chuban she, 2007), 320-21. 
5 Yongwook Ryu, “The Yasukuni Controversy: Divergent Perspectives from the Japanese 
Political Elite?” Asian Survey 5 (September/October):706.
6 Zhu Feng, “Quanli biangeng, rentong duili yu zhanlue xuanze - Zhongriguanxi de zhanglue 
weilai” [Power Shift, Identity Conflict, and Strategic Choice: The Strategic Future of Sino-
Japanese Relations], Shijie zhenzhi yu jingji [Journal of World Economy and Politics] 319, no. 
3 (March 2007):17.
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China is guided by a calculated, unified foreign policy strategy. But these views 
overlook the impact of Japanese domestic politics on its China policy, and fail to 
explain why Japan sometimes favors a cooperative policy toward China in certain 
issue areas, if its China policy is perceived to be assertive.7 Given the frequent 
shifts within the Japanese cabinet in the recent decade, there is also the question 
of whether Japan has articulated a long-term, consistent strategy toward the rise 
of China since the mid-1990s. As the literature on domestic foundation to foreign 
policy suggests, we must take into account the domestic political process within 
Japan while analyzing Japanese diplomacy toward rising China.
2. Domestic Source of Japan’s China Policy: 
  A Framework
Domestic politics has been the central theme in studying a state’s foreign policy. 
In this article, it is proposed that Japan’s China policy can be understood through 
the perspective of the domestic legitimacy of individual leaders. As early as the 
16th century, Italian politician Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1557) outlined the im-
portance of retaining power for a ruler in his book The Prince (1531). Machiavelli 
takes a pessimistic stance toward human nature. In his view, a ruler needs to adopt 
moral standards different from those of ordinary individuals to ensure the survival 
of the state in general and the ruler himself in particular. A ruler who “wants to act 
the part of a good man in all circumstances will bring about his own ruin.” A ruler 
who wants to hold power, Machiavelli stresses, must learn how to not be good and 
to know when it is necessary to use this knowledge.8 In this sense, Machiavelli 
suggests that it is much safer for a ruler to be feared than loved.9 
The importance of political survival of individual leaders during international 
negotiation was frequently discussed by IR scholars working on the interaction 
between domestic politics and foreign policy. Peter Gourevitch, for example, 
proposes the second image reversed theory, suggesting that individual leaders tend 
to mobilize the nation’s international resources to strengthen their own political 
legitimacy in a domestic power rivalry. Individual leaders would find that a diplo-
7 For example, Koizumi’s treatment over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2004 obviously 
demonstrated certain concern about China’s stance on the issue. Koizumi decided to release 
Chinese crew members who entered the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. For details, see “Nicchu 
mitsuyaku adda” [Japan-China Senkaku Secret Agreement Found], Asahi Shimbun Weekly 
AERA, October 25, 2010, 12-15. 
8 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995), 48.
9 For detailed discussion on the importance of power to a ruler, see Niccolo Machiavelli, The 
Prince, Chapter 10, Chapter 15 and Chapter 17.
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matic success would in return empower their domestic authority.10 Robert Putnam 
points out that a chief negotiator will normally give primacy to his or her domes-
tic calculations during an international negotiation. The chief negotiator may try 
to enhance his standing in domestic politics by increasing his political resources 
or by minimizing potential losses in international politics during an international 
negotiation. If an international agreement would contribute to the domestic inter-
ests of the chief negotiator, an international agreement is likely; conversely, if an 
international agreement would threaten domestic interests, or require him or her to 
construct a different coalition, the chief negotiator will be reluctant to endorse it.11 
Helen Milner maintains that political actors are rational and cooperation among 
nations is less affected by fears of other countries’ relative gains or cheating than 
it is by domestic distributional consequences of cooperative endeavors.12 In dis-
cussing the role of executive policy preferences, Milner outlined that the political 
costs of national leaders during an international negotiation matter. The term “po-
litical cost”, according to Milner, refers to two aspects: the distributional conse-
quences of choosing cooperative policies and the loss of unilateral control over a 
policy instrument. By following this logic, international cooperation is unlikely if 
the policy undermines the interests of domestic actors whose support is valued by 
political leaders. Political leaders must believe that the political benefits from in-
ternational cooperation outweigh the costs, and no cooperation should be regarded 
as the worse choice.13
A breakthrough piece of work, The Logic of Political Survival, collectively 
written by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and 
James Morrow, examines the theme of domestic political survival in detail in 
the context of the wider range of political, economic, and foreign issues such 
as revolution, taxation, and war, with the application of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods. Based on several early studies focusing on office-seeking 
and political coalition, the study proposes a so-called selectorate theory and draws 
attention to political survival as a central goal of political leaders.14 The political 
survival of every leader, according to this theory, depends on the maintenance of a 
winning coalition of supporters. If a leader loses the loyalty of a sufficient number 
10 Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic 
Politics,” International Organization 32, no. 4 (Autumn, 1978): 905.
11 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” 
International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer, 1988): 456-59.
12 Helen Milner, Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International 
Relations (Princeton University, 1997), 11.
13 Ibid., 46.
14 For early studies related to political survival of politicians in democracies, see Anthony 
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracies (New York: Harper, 1957); William H. Riker, 
The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962).
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of members of the winning coalition, a challenger can replace the leader in office. 
Coalition members come from a group called the “selectorate”, which consists 
of those individuals who might find themselves in the winning coalition. In a 
democracy, the winning coalition is the group of voters who elect the leader. With 
a large winning coalition and large selectorate in the democratic institution, which 
increase the probability that a member of the current leader’s coalition will be 
included in a challenger’s coalition, the bonds between leaders and their coalition 
members become weaker. In this sense, with the desire to survive and retain 
power, political leaders in a democracy tend to spend more effort maintaining 
their winning coalition supporters’ loyalties, thus influencing the selection of 
domestic and foreign policies they pursue. This interest explains why bad policy 
might sometimes be good politics, and similarly, good policies bad politics.15
This study shares the assumptions stated above. In this article, Japan’s China 
policy is examined by focusing on the domestic political legitimacy of individual 
leaders. The term “legitimacy”, according to Geuss, can be applied to “a certain 
specific government or regime” or to “the personnel who claim to be the represen-
tatives of an organization.”16 This paper assumes that political leaders of a state, 
particularly in democracies, would need to consider a foreign policy decision by 
calculating the consequences of such a decision in the context of their domestic 
political welfare. Extending this framework, as Japan is a democracy with a par-
liamentary system, it will be assumed that seeking election or reelection on the na-
tional party level and thusly consolidating majority support within the ruling party 
are of vital interest to the domestic political survival of Japanese prime ministers. 
This study contends that the domestic political legitimacy of individual leaders is 
a vital factor that affects Japan’s China policy. The orientation of Japan’s China 
policy is dependent on whether a cooperative policy would undermine a prime 
minister’s chance of staying in office. A cooperative policy is more likely to pass 
if it does not threaten to undermine, or rather, has potential to contribute to, the 
domestic interests of an office-seeking prime minister. 
To illustrate the argument, Japan’s response to China’s pressure over the 
Yasukuni issue during the Abe administration (2006-07) has intentionally been 
chosen. This case is selected because it meets important methodological criteria.17 
Of particular interest here in Abe’s case is that before assuming office in 2006, 
Abe consistently supported prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine. He was 
widely regarded as a postwar born Japanese prime minister determined to lead 
15 Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2003), 7-15. 
16 Raymond Geuss, History and Illusion in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 31.
17  For the methods of case studies, see George and Bennett (2004), 153-56.
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Japan in breaking away from the postwar regime. Before assuming premiership, 
Abe had repeatedly stressed the legitimacy of prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni 
and the necessity of a stronger stance against Chinese pressure.18 While serving 
as chief cabinet secretary in the Koizumi administration from October 2005, Abe 
was critical toward China’s protests over the Yasukuni issue and defined China’s 
pressure as an intervention of Japan’s domestic affairs. Ironically, it was also 
Abe who succumbed to Beijing’s demand at the beginning of his term in 2006, 
ceasing visitation of Yasukuni Shrine during his whole tenure in office. Why did 
Abe Shinzo, a Japanese Prime Minister who originally promoted official Yasukuni 
visits, comply with China’s wishes? What is to account for this divergence? In the 
following section, we should expect to see evidence in the case study that Japanese 
prime ministers were particularly concerned with the domestic consequences of 
different policy options on how to respond to Chinese pressure.
3. Case Study: The Yasukuni Controversy (2006-07)
1) A Political Survival Interpretation
Abe’s two-day “ice-breaking” visit to Beijing in October 2006 symbolized a 
turning point in the deadlocked political relations between China and Japan, first 
brought upon by Koizumi’s persistent Yasukuni visits in the previous six years. 
As Koizumi’s successor, Abe entered a relatively favorable political climate com-
pared to that which welcomed Koizumi in 2001. He had enjoyed majority favor 
both within the LDP and the general public. Within the LDP, Abe was supported 
by the Mori faction, the largest faction within the LDP, and by most of the Diet 
members with no factional background since the landslide LDP victory in the 
September 2005 lower house election. In addition, Abe was also supported by 
other small factions, such as Koga and Nikai.19 As for the general public, a poll 
conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun in mid-August 2006 showed that the majority 
of those polled thought Abe would be the most appropriate next prime minister of 
Japan.20 Such a political context indicates that Abe had strong enough domestic 
support in his early period of premiership to compromise on the Yasukuni issue. 
On the other hand, however, although he enjoyed majority support within the 
LDP and general public, Abe found himself in a challenging situation after assum-
18 For Abe’s supportive attitude toward Yasukuni visitation, see Abe and Noda (2002); Abe and 
Okazaki (2004): 135-58; Abe (2006), 66-74.
19 Yomiuri Shimbun, August 9, 2006, morning edition, 1; Yomiuri Shimbun, September 14, 
2006, morning edition, 2.
20 Yomiuri Shimbun, August 17, 2006, morning edition, 4.
Japan’s Domestic Politics and China Policy: The Yasukuni Controversy (2006-07)
32 The Journal of Contemporary China Studies, Vol.2, No. 2
ing premiership. The major reason Abe was able to gain such tremendous support 
from the majority of the LDP, apart from Koizumi’s influence, was that he was 
widely conceived by major faction leaders as a person able to lead the LDP to vic-
tory in the upcoming upper house election in August 2007. In other words, Abe 
would face a serious legitimacy problem within the LDP if he could not win the 
forthcoming election. In this sense, maintaining majority support and widening 
the domestic coalitions within the LDP as long as possible became Abe’s primary 
political objectives in his first year of office. Policies related to Yasukuni were 
thus carefully considered in the context of domestic politics.
After becoming prime minister in September 2006, despite the fact that he had 
majority support within the LDP and the general public, Abe was faced with a 
clear test. Because Abe’s perceived ability to secure a win for the LDP in the Au-
gust 2007 upper house election factored so heavily in his popularity among major 
faction leaders within the LDP, the upcoming upper house election was especially 
charged. Three major facets stood out here. The first concerned the influence of 
local elections in April 2007 to the upper house election. It was widely recognized 
within the LDP that a concentration of time and effort of many local LDP mem-
bers toward their own local election rather than the national-level upper house 
election might result in unavoidable failure for the LDP election campaign. The 
second was the influence of the reform in local towns. Originally, most members 
of local town assemblies were from the LDP. When the number of local towns 
decreased due to the administrative reform, LDP power on a local level shrunk 
drastically, causing a negative impact on the national-level election. The third was 
the influence of Koizumi’s reform. As many local areas were dissatisfied with the 
policy advocated by the Koizumi administration, which focused on economic de-
velopment in urban areas, voters in rural areas tended to support the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ) led by Ozawa Ichiro. With these three upcoming domestic 
challenges in mind, keeping the current majority support as long as possible while 
widening the domestic coalitions as soon as possible within the LDP and the gen-
eral public became Abe’s primary political objectives for his first year in office. In 
this sense, how to deal with China’s pressure over the Yasukuni issue was given 
careful consideration within the context of domestic politics.
A limited compromise with ambiguity over the Yasukuni issue would not un-
dermine but rather contribute to Abe’s political survival in domestic politics. Start-
ing from 2006, sufficient evidence indicates that Abe started to treat the Yasukuni 
issue strategically for two purposes: 1) to win the LDP presidential election, and 2) 
to consolidate domestic support after assuming premiership.
For the first purpose, Abe’s motivation was to prevent the Yasukuni issue from 
casting a negative shadow on his LDP presidential election campaign. Major fig-
ures within the Mori faction and advisors around Abe took a prudent approach to 
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the Yasukuni issue. Mori and Koizumi themselves openly suggested that it was un-
necessary for the new prime minister to visit Yasukuni Shrine.21 Advisors in Abe’s 
camp were extremely worried that Abe’s opposition within the LDP might utilize 
this Yasukuni issue during the presidential election. On January 17, 2006, Fukuda 
Yasuo, one of Abe’s major potential adversaries, expressed a cautious attitude 
toward the Yasukuni issue during a conference held in Fukuoka. Fukuda was also 
a member of the group related to the national memorial facility (Kokuritsu tsuito 
shisetsu o kangaeru kai), which suggests an alternative plan for national mourn-
ing.22 The major participants of this group, such as Kato Koichi and Yamasaki 
Taku, were uniformly against Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits. For this reason, support-
ers within the Abe camp were particularly worried that a clear distinction would 
emerge if Abe were to express a supportive attitude toward Yasukuni visits, as 
such explicit advocacy would breed uncertainty around Abe’s election campaign. 
In this sense, it is understandable why Abe’s camp was so worried about critical 
voices from the United States over the Yasukuni issue, as this criticism could be 
used as fodder to attack Abe’s campaign during the LDP presidential election.23 It 
was reported that major advisors of Abe debated appropriate attitudes toward the 
Yasukuni issue in July 2006. Although most of them suggested that Abe take an 
assertive stance against China’s pressure, the political risks accompanying this op-
tion, such as possible attack from opposition within the LDP and even within the 
Mori faction against Abe, forced them to carefully reconsider the issue.24 It was 
reported that this so-called ambiguous strategy later employed by Abe over the 
Yasukuni issue throughout his term was confirmed during this period.25
For the second purpose, advisors in Abe’s camp believed the stability of 
the Abe administration in the upcoming upper house election in August 2007 
was the most important mission and any disputes over the Yasukuni issue with 
China would only shake the stability of Abe’s new administration.26 Shimomura 
Hakubun, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary of the Abe administration, mentioned 
that the long-term objective of the Abe cabinet was to hold office for two terms 
with six years.27 Shimizu Masato, a Nihon Keizai Shimbun senior political journal-
21 Asahi Shimbun, March 28, 2006, morning edition, 2.
22 Mainichi Shimbun, January 31, 2006, morning edition, 2.
23 Yomiuri Shimbun, July 21, 2006, morning edition, 14.
24 These major advisors included Ito Tetsuo, Nakanishi Terumasa, Nishioka Tsutomu, Shimada 
Youichi, Yagi Hidetsugu, Shimomura Hakubun, Takaichi Sanae, and Seko Hiroshige. Some of 
them were later appointed as cabinet members in the Abe administration. See Uesugi Takashi, 
Kantei houkai [The Collapse of the Prime Ministerial Office] (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2007), 36.
25  Uesugi Takashi, Kantei houkai, 60.
26  Yomiuri Shimbun, August 17, 2006, morning edition, 4.
27 Shimizu Masato, Shusho no Satetsu – Posuto Koizumi kenryoku no tasokare [The Failure 
of the Prime Minister: The Dawn of Power in the Post-Koizumi Era] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai 
Shimbunsha, 2009), 121-22.
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ist, correctly points out that maintaining strategic ambiguity over the Yasukuni 
issue with China until the upper house election in 2007 was intentional on Abe’s 
part, it being the safest approach for the survival of the new administration.28 Ob-
viously, maintaining an ambiguous attitude over the issue while ceasing visits to 
Yasukuni Shrine would be the best strategy for gaining support from both liberals 
and conservatives within the LDP. Yamamoto Ichita, a close ally of Abe’s and an 
LDP Diet member of the upper house, expressed to the Mainichi Shimbun in 2006 
that the conservatives would be satisfied if Abe were to visit Yasukuni Shrine at 
the beginning of his premiership and then cease visits temporarily.29 It was report-
ed that there were expectations within the LDP that Abe’s new initiative on Asian 
diplomacy would benefit the by-elections in the Kanagawa Prefecture No. 16 and 
Osaka Prefecture No. 9 districts held on October 22, which were considered the 
prelude to the upper house election in 2007.30
The priority of seeking office influenced Abe’s responses to China’s pressure 
over the Yasukuni issue. In Abe’s calculation, the Yasukuni issue was no longer 
an appropriate card for seeking domestic support as it was for Koizumi, as many 
members within the LDP thought maintaining the stability of the new adminis-
tration and preparing for the upcoming election should be the primary concerns. 
Instead, an implicit compromise to China’s demands would conversely strengthen 
support for Abe in terms of ability to handle foreign affairs and widen his domes-
tic coalition. Seko Hiroshige, one of his senior political advisors, also openly ad-
mitted in August 2006 to believing that Abe regards the Yasukuni issue as a useful 
diplomatic card to China and thusly approaches the issue strategically.31
Based on Table 1 below, Abe tackled Yasukuni and China’s pressure strategi-
cally, step by step. First, Abe made a secret visit to Yasukuni Shrine in April 2006, 
waiting until early August to make his visit known to the media. It was on August 
5 that Japanese media reported that Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe had visited Ya-
sukuni Shrine in April; according to Uesugi, this information was intentionally 
leaked to NHK and Sankei Shimbun.32 The timing of the declaration was exactly 
one week before Koizumi’s last Yasukuni visit. Abe clearly planned the timing of 
his Yasukuni visit and successfully avoided demands from both conservatives and 
liberals. It would also be difficult for China to protest, as the visit was conducted 
in a low profile.33
28 Ibid, 117.
29 Mainichi Shimbun, January 31, 2006, morning edition, 2.
30 Yomiuri Shimbun, October 5, 2006, p.4.
31 Interview of Seko Hiroshige, Bungeishunju (August 2006), 122.
32 Uesugi Takeshi, Kantei hokai [The Collapse of the Prime Ministerial Office] (Tokyo: 
Shinchosha, 2007), 38.
33 Yomiuri Shimbun, August 5, 2006, morning edition, 4; Yomiuri Weekly, September 3, 2006, 
22-23.
35
Date Events
April 2006 Abe secretly visits Yasukuni Shrine 
September 20, 2006 Abe elected as Prime Minister of Japan
September 23,2006 The 6th round of China-Japan strategic dialogue, Tokyo
September 28,2006 Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo visits Tokyo for the second round of diplomatic negotiation
October 2, 2006 Cabinet Secretariat declares Abe’s official visit to China
October 8, 2006 Abe visits Beijing and meets major Chinese leaders
April 11, 2007 Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visits Japan
May 8, 2007 Cabinet Secretariat confirms that Prime Minister Abe sent an offering to Yasukuni Shrine
August 15, 2007 No visit to Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Abe
Table 1: Sino-Japanese Yasukuni Controversy, 2006-07
Source: Author
The second step was to negotiate secretly with Beijing and to make political 
profit from Beijing’s demands. The rapid official visit to Beijing just 11 days after 
Abe assumed premiership indicated that Abe’s policy toward Chinese pressure 
over Yasukuni was guided by a calculation starting from a very early period. Abe’s 
political advisors had been working actively under the table on the issue. Naka-
gawa Hidenao, Chairman of the Policy Research Council in the LDP and also a 
close political ally of Abe, was one example. In as early as June 2006, Nakagawa 
suggested to Koizumi that the Chidorigahuchi National Garden be considered as a 
place for national mourning that could allow visits by overseas leaders.34 This sug-
gestion was later surprisingly accepted by Koizumi for further consideration.35 On 
August 3, 2006, during a seminar held in Tokyo, Nakagawa also stated that it was 
the mission of the next administration to improve Sino-Japanese relations.36 All of 
these subtle changes indicated that Abe intended to rework the political function 
of the Yasukuni issue under his new administration. 
Negotiation with China was also given higher priority in the political agenda 
very early on. In January 2006, a well-known Japanese journalist Dasei Yasuhiro 
was told by Nakagawa Hidenao, the LDP’s Policy Research Council Chair-
man and also one of Abe’s trusted political allies, that negotiation with China on 
Yasukuni had already begun.37 Further evidence exists in Nakagawa’s frequent 
meetings with Chinese officials, such as Chinese Ambassador to Japan Wang Yi. 
As early as February 19, 2006, Nakagawa visited Beijing and discussed Sino-
34 Shibata Gaku, “Sousaisen Saidai no ronten Yasukuni o meguru jimintou no hyakka soumei” 
[LDP Presidential Election: A Hot Debate within the LDP over the Yasukuni Issue], Chuokoron 
(August 2006): 215.
35 Mainichi Shimbun, June 27, 2006, morning edition, 2.
36 Mainichi Shimbun, August 4, 2006, morning edition, 5.
37 Uesugi Takeshi, “Nakagawa Hidenao kanjicho ura no rirekisho,” 284.
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Japanese relations with Chinese leadership. On September 8, Shiozaki Yasuhisa, 
who was later appointed as chief cabinet secretary during the Abe administration, 
was ordered by Nakagawa to visit China for three days. 
At the bureaucratic level, Yachi Shotaro, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
was the key figure that negotiated directly with Beijing for Tokyo’s new initiative. 
Yachi was reportedly the most trusted person of Abe within MOFA, and he was 
requested by Abe to set a plan for an official visit to China and South Korea while 
Abe was still serving as chief cabinet secretary.38 Hong Kong-based media reports 
also confirmed that the plan for improving relations with China had been secretly 
drafted within MOFA in early 2006, based on the instruction of Yachi.39 In his 
memoir published in April 2009, Yachi confirmed that he spoke frankly with Chi-
nese Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo in an informal meeting in Niigata pre-
fecture after the 4th round of the China-Japan strategic dialogue held in February 
2006. Yachi persuaded Dai to accept Abe’s plan to visit China by pointing out that 
Abe’s ambiguous attitude over the Yasukuni issue itself would serve as an oppor-
tunity for China, and rejecting Abe’s official visit would virtually offer an excuse 
for Abe to potentially pay a visit to Yasukuni in the future.40 After several rounds 
of communication, on September 28, 2006, China accepted Tokyo’s plan for Abe 
to make a two-day trip to Beijing on October 8 and 9.
As governmental policy over the Yasukuni issue shifted, Abe adopted an am-
biguous strategy at both international and domestic tables, refraining from stat-
ing whether or not he would visit Yasukuni Shrine. Public opinion in Japan was 
gradually re-manipulated by the Abe administration. Public statements made by 
Abe changed tremendously, displaying increasing ambiguity since the summer of 
2006. Abe’s basic strategy was to avoid making an explicit statement on the Yasu-
kuni issue. In a TV program on June 3, Abe stated that he did not intend to make 
a clear statement on whether he would visit Yasukuni Shrine. Abe further stressed 
that if the issue became a diplomatic problem, it would not be necessary to ad-
dress it during the LDP presidential election. In a public speech on June 11, Abe 
further solidified his equivocal position by stressing that it was unnecessary to 
take a clear stance on the Yasukuni issue, lest it be utilized by China, South Korea 
and politicians within Japan.41 This stance remained unchanged until the last day 
38 Yomiuri Shimbun, October 5, 2006, p.3. 
39 For details, see Yazhou Zhoukan [Asia Weekly], May 25, 2008, 34-38; Tarumi Hideo, a 
China specialist in MOFA who was appointed as the director of the China and Mongolian 
Division in 2008, confirmed to Hong Kong journalist that he drafted the plan on improving re-
lations with China in 2006. See Yazhou Zhoukan [Asia Weekly], January 11, 2009, 30-31.
40 Yachi Shotaro, Gaiko no senryaku to kokorozashi [The Strategy of Diplomacy and 
Ambition] (Tokyo: Sankeishimbunsha, 2009), 36-41.
41 Shibata Gaku, “Sousaisen saidai no ronten Yasukuni wo meguru jimintou no hyakka 
soumei,” 211.
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of the Abe administration in September 2007.
On the other hand, at the international front, Abe avoided creating the impres-
sion among his domestic audience that he made a compromise with China. On 
October 6, the Chinese consulate in Tokyo Embassy Kong Quanyou stated that 
China believed that Abe would not visit Yasukuni Shrine within his term as prime 
minister. On the same day, Abe implicitly refuted China’s statement and stressed 
that no such agreement had been made between the two countries, secretly or oth-
erwise, previous to the conclusion of the Japan-China top leader summit in Octo-
ber 2006.42 
Yasukuni was doubtlessly a stepping-stone for Abe. However Abe may have ra-
tionalized his actions to both sides, it should be acknowledged that by abstaining 
from Yasukuni visits while embracing a strategy that allowed ambiguity, Abe was 
able to resume a bilateral summit meeting with China that had been suspended for 
almost five years. The summit meeting in early October 2006, in return, benefited 
Abe domestically. A poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun after Abe’s visit to Beijing 
in October revealed that 83% of those polled commented positively on Abe’s dip-
lomatic initiative with China and South Korea. 52% valued his style in dealing 
with the Yasukuni issue.43 At this stage, Abe’s objective of utilizing Yasukuni to 
consolidate and broaden his domestic coalition was basically achieved. It is worth 
noting that Abe visited Yasukuni on August 15, 2008, one year after his resigna-
tion as Prime Minister in September 2007.
2) Alternative Interpretations: A Comparison
What other factors might account for the responses of the Abe administration to 
China’s pressure over the Yasukuni issue? This section discusses two alternative 
explanations for making sense of this puzzle. While acknowledging the certain ex-
planatory power of these factors, it will be demonstrated why these explanations 
are insufficient in explaining the abnormal response of the Abe administration to 
China in 2006-07.
Economic Interdependence 
Firstly, one may argue that Abe adopted a cooperative policy toward Chinese 
pressure by offering analysis from the perspective of economic interdependence. 
By following the logic that the chance of conflict between two countries can be 
largely reduced given a dynamic of economic interdependence, it is tempting to 
view Abe’s compromise to Chinese pressure as an effort to deepen economic in-
terdependence between China and Japan. Upon this interpretation, Abe acted as a 
42 Asahi Shimbun, October 7, 2006, morning edition, 1.
43 Ibid., October 11, 2006, 4.
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national leader prioritizing the national interest when he ceased visits to Yasukuni 
Shrine.44 
This economic interdependence-based argument is somehow convincing. But it 
cannot answer a very fundamental question: According to official data, China had 
assumed the rank of number one trading partner to Japan in 2004.45 Why, then, 
considering the closeness of China-Japan economic relations, would Koizumi still 
choose to visit Yasukuni Shrine in 2004? Why does the factor of economic inter-
dependence carry such weight for Abe but not Koizumi? An interpretation based 
on economic interdependence fails to offer a convincing answer to these questions 
from a comparative perspective. In fact, as demonstrated previously, Koizumi was 
determined to visit Yasukuni Shrine despite strong urging against it from major 
figures in the Japanese economic circle. 
The Role of the United States
One may also be argued that the United States might factor into Abe’s different 
response to Chinese pressure. It is true that Washington’s concern over Japan’s 
stance toward Yasukuni had grown by Abe’s time, and the US urged Japan to ex-
ercise prudence over the issue. This change in attitude, according to this stream 
of analysis, is attributable to the United States’ realization that growing anti-
Japanese sentiments in China could undermine the interests of the United States in 
East Asia. And so it may have been US pressure that caused Abe to reconsider his 
policy over the Yasukuni issue as well as his responses to Chinese pressure.46 
This vein of interpretation is insufficient in two ways. First, as was shown in 
the previous section, the United States never pressured Japan over the Yasukuni 
issue in an official capacity during the Koizumi or Abe administrations. Criticism 
of Japan’s stance over the Yasukuni issue within the United States came mostly 
from the legislative branch and from former officials responsible for diplomatic 
and security affairs in East Asia.47 These figures included US House of Represen-
tatives Committee on International Relations Chairman Henry J. Hyde, former 
US Ambassador to Japan Howard Baker, former Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense Kurt Campbell, former US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, 
44 For this type of argument, see, for example, Xide Jin, “Anbei waijiao de chuqichengxiao yu 
zhanwang” [The Initial Achievements and Prospects of Abe Diplomacy], Riben xukan [Japanese 
Studies] 6 (2006): 36.
45 Gaiko seisho 2006 [Japanese Diplomatic Bluebook], 40.
46 Hoshi Hiroshi, Abe seiken no nihon [Japan under the Abe Administration] (Asahi 
Shimbunsha, 2006), 67-68.
47 Relevant criticism to Japan’s stance over Yasukuni may also from US think tank experts in 
the informal occasions. For this point , the author appreciates comments from Mr. Watanabe 
Tsuneo.
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former US Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre, and former political coun-
selor at the US Embassy in Japan William Breer.48 The executive branch of the 
US government has been very judicious in giving any official comments on the 
Yasukuni controversy between China and Japan.49 On December 8, 2005, US Un-
dersecretary of State Nicholas Burns expressed concern about the history problem 
between China and Japan during his meeting with Maehara Seiji, the former presi-
dent of the DPJ. Burns only stressed that the United States hoped that the dispute 
could be settled by the efforts of the two countries.50 In addition, as mentioned 
earlier, Washington did not positively respond to China’s request to pressure Japan 
over the Yasukuni issue in April 2006.51 As Michael J. Green, the former senior 
director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council (NSC) in the Bush ad-
ministration, pointed out, Washington hoped that the Yasukuni dispute could be 
settled by Japan itself, not by pressure from any other country. Green stressed that 
Japan would not benefited from the Yasukuni problem because diplomatically the 
issue could be utilized by China against Japan.52 The official statements released 
by the White House soon after Koizumi’s sixth visit to Yasukuni Shrine in 2006 
confirmed Green’s analysis. On August 15, 2006, the White House spokesper-
son openly clarified that the President did not intend to interfere in the Yasukuni 
48 For a general introduction to the US view of the China-Japan Yasukuni controversy, see 
Mike Mochizuki, “Beikoku wa dou miteirunoka” [How the United States Views (the Yasukuni 
Problem)], Ronza (September 2006): 66-73; The Mainichi Shimbun also published a detailed 
special report on how the US views the Yasukuni issue. See Mainichi Shimbun, January 1, 
2006, morning edition, 1-2; Mainichi Shimbun, January 30, 2006, morning edition, 1-2; For 
criticism, for example, in April 2006, Henry J. Hyde sent a letter to Speaker of the House 
Dennis Hastert, demanding Koizumi not be invited to give a speech at Congress during his 
June visit to the United States, unless Koizumi pledged that he would not pay a shrine visit 
after returning home. The former US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage pointed out 
in an interview by Sankei Shimbun on July 20, 2006 that the historical narrative adopted by 
the Yushukan, a war museum within Yasukuni Shrine, would hurt the feelings of American 
and Chinese. However, Armitage also expressed that Japan should not compromise to China’s 
pressure over the Yasukuni issue during TBS news program News 23 on May 30, 2005. Former 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell explicitly expressed a critical view of 
Yushukan and pointed out that US silence over the Yasukuni issue does not mean Washington 
supports Tokyo’s stance. For details on Campbell’s view, see an interview by Tatsumi Yuki, 
Ronza (September 2006): 74-79.
49 For example, during a press conference after the US-Japan summit held in Kyoto in 
November 2005, US Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer avoided direct comment on the 
Yasukuni problem. But in 2006, Ambassador Schieffer expressed a negative view of Yushukan 
during an interview by Japanese TBS television on July 12, 2006. For details, see Mainichi 
Shimbun, August 10, 2006, morning edition, 2.
50 Mainichi Shimbun, January 1, 2006, morning edition, 2.
51 According to a researcher in the American Enterprise Institute, visitors from China to their 
think tank started to raise the Japanese nationalism issue frequently during the Koizumi era. 
See Mainichi Shimbun, January 30, 2006, morning edition, 2
52 Ibid.
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controversy and the dispute should be settled by the countries involved—China, 
South Korea and Japan. In responding to questions about the US government’s 
view toward the next Japanese prime minister’s stance on the Yasukuni issue, the 
spokesman avoided direct commentary, stressing that it was an issue that should 
be left to Japanese politicians.53 
Second, the analysis focusing on US influence fails to explain why criticism 
from the United States did not work for Koizumi but did for Abe. Criticism from 
former diplomatic officials and scholars in the United States surfaced in early 
2006. These criticisms, however, did not interfere with Koizumi’s last visit to Ya-
sukuni Shrine that year. During the US-Japan summit held in Kyoto on November 
16, 2005, Koizumi openly claimed that he would continue to visit Yasukuni Shrine 
in spite of President Bush’s entreaty against it.54 Considering the similar climate 
and circumstances of the Koizumi and Abe administrations, the analysis focused 
on the role of the US is not able to explain the inconsistency of Japan’s response 
to Chinese pressure.
Conclusion 
As seen in the previous analysis, political survival analysis, which stresses the 
domestic legitimacy of individual leaders, can offer a logical explanation to 
Japan’s responses to Chinese pressure over the Yasukuni issue during the Abe 
administration. This article suggests that the low domestic cost of international 
cooperation in terms of office-seeking is what led Abe to compromise to China’s 
pressure over the Yasukuni issue. Ceasing visits to Yasukuni Shrine allowed 
him to avoid potential criticism from his opponents within the LDP during the 
presidential election and helped foster diplomatic reconciliation with China in 
2006, which in return offered Abe an opportunity to broaden his domestic coali-
tion within the LDP before the upcoming upper house election. The power rivalry 
in office-seeking was found to be a vital factor behind Japan’s cooperative policy 
towards China vis-à-vis the Yasukuni issue during the Abe administration.
The case of Abe also has a profound implication for the study of Japan’s China 
policy in general. As shown in the case study in this paper, domestic political ri-
valry of individual leaders, rather than foreign strategic calculation to China, was 
53 Yomiuri Shimbun, August 16, 2006, accessed May 12, 2007, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/fea-
ture/fe6700/news/20060816i102.htm.
54 Kyoto News, January 21, 2006, accessed August 12, 2008, http://www.47news.jp/
CN/200601/CN2006012101004377.html. Koizumi himself introduced this part of conver-
sion with US president George W. Bush during a speech in Kagoshima after he retired from 
prime minister in July 2007. See Yomiuri Shimbun, July 24, 2007, morning edition, 4. Also see 
Mainichi Shimbun, February 3, 2006, morning edition, 2.
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at the heart of Japan’s policy toward China over the Yasukuni issue. Abe utilized 
the seemingly nationalistic and sentimental controversy over Yasukuni Shrine for 
his domestic purposes. Thus, Japan’s China policy in certain issue areas may not 
necessarily follow a unified China policy, but may, with little thought of China it-
self, be guided by a strategy for winning support at home.
Other aspects of Japanese domestic politics are also relevant. After studying the 
Chinese fishing boat collision incident near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2010, 
Wan, for instance, pointed out that we may also take into account other factors in 
Japanese party politics that may further complicate the relations of the two coun-
tries.55 Here, I briefly suggest two additional aspects of Japanese domestic politics 
for further research:
1) The frequent change of prime ministers / Regime Transition
Japan has unusually unstable leadership, with prime ministers cycling through 
rather frequently in the past decade. Unstable leadership may cause inconsistency 
in foreign policy, leading to misperceptions or miscalculations of previously 
settled issues. In addition, the regime transition from LDP to DPJ in Japan has 
also posed a major challenge to the consistency of the country’s China policy. 
For instance, it is open to doubt whether the LDP is well organized in terms of 
communication with the DPJ on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with China. 
The Chinese fishing boat collision incident in 2010 indicated that the DPJ’s top 
leaders may not have fully understood the complexity of the island dispute with 
China, resulting in Chinese fury. 
2) The conflict between the ruling party and elite bureaucrats
The issue of coordination between the ruling party and elite bureaucrats on 
foreign affairs has long been one of the central problems of the Japanese political 
system. It is imperative that whether the role of decision maker on the Japanese 
side is well coordinated, and that diplomatic message is being well received by the 
key person on the Japanese side. For instance, during the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
fishing boat incident in 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not properly 
inform the Kan administration about the Chinese protests. It was also reported 
later that it was bureaucrats specializing on China, rather than the party leaders in 
Kantei, who played the decisive role in communicating with the Chinese govern-
ment.56 Clearly, a lack of coordination within Japanese government could pose a 
55 Ming Wan, “Japan’s Party Politics and China Policy: The Chinese Fishing Boat Collision 
Incident,” George Mason University, accessed February 3, 2012, http://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/
democracy/doc/Paper_Wan.pdf
56 “Gaimushou ga hanatta chuugoku misshi” [The Secret Messenger from the Foreign 
Ministry], Asahi Shimbun Weekly AERA, November 8, 2010, 19-22. 
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major problem to decision-making in Japan’s China policy, and this issue is worth 
further detailed investigation in the future.
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